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Abstract. Several of the basic cryptographic constructs have associated
algebraic structures. Formal models proposed by Dolev and Yao to study
the (unconditional) security of public key protocols form a group. The
security of some types of protocols can be neatly formulated in this al-
gebraic setting. We investigate classes of two-party protocols. We then
consider extension of the formal algebraic framework to private-key pro-
tocols. We also discuss concrete realization of the formal models. In this
case, we propose a definition in terms of pseudo-free groups.
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groups and monoids.
1 Introduction and Background
The present paper explores some algebraic structures inherent in several classes
of security protocols. Such structures have been known to exist. For example,
the set of possible messages over some alphabet A constitute a free monoid
A∗. The encryption and decryption operations must be inverse of each other. If
we consider them as mappings A∗ → A∗ they form a group. Moreover, many
encryption schemes are based on some well-known algebraic structures. The RSA
encryption is a bijective map Zn → Zn, where Zn is the ring of integers modulo
n. So we have, on the one hand, formal models of classes of protocols which carry
algebraic structures and on the other concrete realizations of these models based
on some sets with inherent algebraic structures. One of the basic issues addressed
in this paper is the notion of security of protocols in the algebraic setting. In the
formal model where we assume perfect encryption the security is unconditional.
Hence, it can be breached due to a faulty design of protocols. In the concrete
model however the encryption is based on the assumption that certain tasks
are computationally infeasible. In this case, the security can be compromised
due to a faulty design or some hidden relations among the basic operators.
Although protocols based on PKC are believed to be secure against passive
attacks, an improperly designed protocols may be compromised by an active
adversary, as first pointed out by Needham and Schroeder [NS78]. The analysis
of all possible such attacks requires some level of abstraction and formalization.
Such a formalization was first given in the seminal work of Dolev and Yao [DY82]
(referred to as DY). The class of protocols discussed in DY are two-party cascade
protocols in which two users exchange messages back and forth. Other notable
early works dealing with the formal approach to security include [BAN89,Low96].
An alternative approach to security is the computational approach. Infor-
mally, a protocol is considered secure if it is computationally infeasible for the
adversary to acquire any useful information [Gol01,AR02]. The computational
approach is more difficult in proving security of protocols. Starting with the work
of [AR02] there has been extensive work to relate the two views of cryptography.
In [AR02] the authors first give the formal framework for some cryptographic
primitives. In terms of security, their main result roughly translates to the fol-
lowing: if we can show that a protocol, formally an expression, is equivalent
to another expression over a fixed string then the protocol is secure since it is
infeasible for the adversary to distinguish between the actual plaintext and an
arbitrary bit string. Thus a formal system is sound if formal indistinguishabil-
ity (FI) implies computational indistinguishability (CI). The converse (CI ⇒
FI) is called the completeness of the formal system. It has been proved for the
Abadi-Rogaway formal system under some extra assumptions [MW04a]. The
works [AR02,MW04a] dealt with symmetric (private) key encryptions and pas-
sive adversaries and in [MW04b] the authors prove soundness of a formal system
similar to [AR02] for public key cryptosystem with active adversaries. The work
[MW04b] deals with issues that are closest to the current work.
In this work we take a fresh look at the DY model. We investigate algebraic
structures associated with a class of protocols based on public key cryptosys-
tems. We observe that the model defined by strings of operators can be given
the structure of group called the Dolev-Yao (DY) group. The main results of
this paper are characterization of the security of the protocols in these group
structures. Specifically, we show that a set of elements (strings) defining the pro-
tocol is insecure if and only if they contain a subgroup. This is strictly true in
the abstract setting when we assume that there are no special relations among
the elements- the DY group is free. In a concrete realization there will be some
relations among the group elements. We propose extensions of the notion of se-
curity in terms of pseudo-free groups rather than free groups. We also consider
extension to private key cryptosystems.
We first review the Dolev-Yao model. One defines the abstract setting of a
protocol in terms of some basic operations (encryption, decryption, nonces etc.).
These operations form a monoid. Then a protocol is simply a sequence of words,
the elements of the monoid. The security of a protocol is defined in terms of
these words. Specifically, we show that a set of elements (strings) defining the
protocol is insecure if and only if they contain a subgroup. We consider first the
simple cascade protocols where the message texts are encrypted and decrypted
straight without further operations like nonces. In this case the monoid turns
out to be a group and a protocol is insecure if and only the elements defining it
form a subgroup. Next, we consider protocols with nonces (name-stamps, date-
stamps etc.). The algebraic characterization is trickier here because some of the
operations are undefined in a real implementation. We show that even in this case
we can sensibly define a monoid of operations and characterize protocol security
in terms of some algebraic condition. We use the algebraic characterizations to
prove some general theorems on secure and insecure protocols. We apply these
results to some well-known protocols. We also discuss the concrete realization
of the cryptosystems. We analyze the implication on security in this situation.
The problem of security in an arbitrary realization is undecidable since it can
be reduced to the word problem [Rot95]. The final section discusses possible
extensions of the definitions and methods.
2 The Dolev-Yao model
In this section we review the essentials of the model proposed by Dolev and
Yao. The first assumption is that we do not concern ourselves with the details
of the public key cryptographic system. Further, we assume that we have a fi-
nite set of symbols E = {E1, E2, . . . , En} where n is an integer. Informally, n
denotes the number of users in the network and Ei represents the public encryp-
tion function of the ith user. Similarly we have another set D = {D1, . . . , Dn}
representing the private decryption function of the users. For example, if Ki
and K ′i are the public and private keys of user i then Ei(M) = E(M,Ki) and
Di(M) = D(M,K
′
i), where E and D are the respective encryption and decryp-
tion functions and M is the message text. We also add another operator, I the
“identity” operator. In general the encryption and decryption schemes need not
be same for all users but they must satisfy EiDi = DiEi = I. We simply treat
them as letters from some alphabet. For each pair of users (i, j) define the sets
Aij = {Ei, Ej , Di} Informally, Aij represents the set of operators available to
user i in a two-party exchange between itself and user j. A two party cascade
protocol is finite sequence of strings {α1, α2, . . . , αr} and {β1, β2, . . . , βr′} where
αi ∈ A
∗
ij and βi ∈ A
∗
ji, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and r
′ = r − 1 or r. Intuitively, users i and
j can use any number of layers of encryption and decryption and thus the set of
operations available are included in E ∪D. The definition of cascade protocols is
a consequence of the following assumption on the protocols [DY82].
1. It is a perfect public key system. Hence: 1. the functions Ei are strictly one
way: they are unbreakable, 2. the public directory is secure: the Ei are fixed
once for all, 3. everyone has access to all the encryption functions Ei, 4. only
user i knows Di.
2. In the two-party protocol only the two parties concerned are involved in the
communication; the assistance of a third party is not needed.
3. The protocols are uniform, that is, the same format is used by any pair of
legitimate users.
4. Next we model the behavior of the adversary. We assume that the adversary
is capable of active attacks. Specifically: 1. the adversary can intercept any
message passing through the communication channels;2. he is a legitimate
user and thus can initiate a dialog with other users; 3. he can successfully
impersonate another user when necessary.
We assume that the above assumptions are valid for any protocol (not just
cascade protocols) unless stated otherwise.
Next we describe the formal model for the protocols. Let x, y be variables
ranging through the set Jn ≡ {0, 1, . . . , n}. A two-party cascade protocol is given
by a pair of sequences
{α1(x, y), α2(x, y), αr(x, y)} and {β1(x, y), β2(x, y), βr′(x, y)} (1)
αi(x, y) ∈ Axy and βi(x, y) ∈ Ayx (2)
Further, define the sequences
N1(x, y) = α1(x, y) N2(x, y) = β1(x, y)α1(x, y)
N2k−1(x, y) = αk(x, y)N2k−2(x, y) N2k(x, y) = βkN2k−1(x, y)
(3)
The intuition behind this abstract definition is the following. User x initiates
the dialog with y by applying α1(x, y) to the message M ∈ {0, 1}
∗. Then, y
responds with the application of β1(x, y), x follows with α2(x, y) and so on. In
round k (k ≥ 1) user x sends the message N2k−1M and in turn, receives the
message N2kM . For example, in the simple protocol discussed later we have
α1(1, 2) = E2, and β1(1, 2) = E1D2 Let P be a two-party cascade protocol. Let
s be any user name (the adversary) and
Γ1(s) = E ∪ {Ds}, Γ2 = {αi(x, y)| for all x 6= y and i ≥ 2} and
Γ3 = {βi(x, y)| for all x 6= y and i ≥ 1}
(4)
Next we define the security of a protocol.
Definition 1 A protocol P is insecure if there is some string λ ∈ Γ1(s)∪Γ2∪Γ3
such that λNk(i, j) = ǫ for some k (ǫ denotes the empty string).
See [DY82] for the motivation for this definition is as follows. If the protocol is
insecure then the secret message can eventually be obtained by the adversary.
3 The Dolev-Yao group for cascade protocols
We start this section with some standard algebraic definitions [Rot95]. A semi-
group is set S with a binary operation or product ◦ that is associative (a ◦
(b ◦ c) = (a ◦ b)). A monoid is a semigroup {S, ◦} with an identity element e
(e◦a = a◦ e = a). A group is a monoidM such that every a ∈M has an inverse
a−1 (a ◦ a−1 = a−1 ◦ a = e). Below we suppress the symbol ◦ for the product.
We have seen above that for cascade protocols the available operators are from
E ∪ D. The set E∗ (the Kleene closure of E) is the set of words, including the
empty word, formed by the alphabet E . Now consider the free group generated
by the set E [MKS76]. We recall the free group construction. Let A be a set (the
alphabet). Let A−1 be another set, disjoint from A such that there is a bijective
correspondence a ↔ a between the two. We write A−1 = {a−1|a ∈ A}. Let ǫ
be the empty string. Then we define a product on the set SA ≡ (A ∪ A
−1)
∗
by
concatenation (σ ·µ = σµ) along with the relations aa−1 = a−1a = ǫ. That is, we
replace aa−1 and a−1a by ǫ in any string. More formally, define an equivalence
relation ∼ between two strings σ and µ as: σ ∼ µ if µ can be obtained from
σ by insertion or deletion of strings of the form aa−1, a−1a and ǫ. Then the set
F (A) = SA/ ∼, the set of equivalence classes is a group. For details see [MKS76].
For convenience, we continue to write the members of F (A) as elements of SA
rather than the equivalence class. For a free monoid we have only the set A and
the relation ǫ. The essential property of a free group or monoid F (A) over the set
A is that any mapping of the set A into a group G can be uniquely extended to
a group homomorphism (see [MKS76] for details). Recall that a homomorphism
between two monoids is a mapping that preserves the identity and products.
A homomorphism between two groups is a homomorphism of the underlying
monoids that preserves inverses. A submonoid A of a monoidM is a subset with
identity that is closed under products. We call F (E) the DY group. Further, we
use Di and E
−1
i interchangeably. A concrete realization of the DY group is given
by the action of encryption and decryption operators on {0, 1}∗, the set of bi-
nary strings. Thus, if Ki, and Pi are i’s public and private key respectively then
Ei(m) = E(m,Ki) and Di(m) = D(m,Pi). We note that a concrete realization
of a free group may result in more relations. For example, for a commutative
group we have the relations ab ∼ ba. We further mention that a particular re-
alization realization of the DY group in the RSA encryption scheme is distinct
from the RSA group [Riv04]. In general, the latter is commutative while the
former is not.
Let us consider an example discussed in [DY82]. User i sends j a message
m (i, Ej(m), j) and then j sends back the message (j, Ei(m), i). This protocol is
very easily broken. The adversary, henceforth denoted by s, intercepts the first
message from i and sends it to j. Then j sends the message (j, Es(m), s). The
adversary decrypts the message using Ds. It is easy to verify that in this case
the the monoid generated sets Γ1 = {Ds} and Γ2 = {EsDjEj} a subgroup of
DY. We will see that this is a general phenomenon for insecure protocols.
3.1 An algebraic characterization of security
In this section we come to the main theme of this work. Dolev and Yao gave
a characterization of the secure cascade protocols in terms of properties of the
strings αi(x, y) and βj(x, y). We prove an equivalent characterization in the
algebraic setting of the DY group. We can then deduce their characterization.
In the following, the word generate will always imply the multiplicative set (a
monoid).
Theorem 1 Let P be a two-party cascade protocol. Assume that the parties
involved have names 1 and 2 and the adversary is s. Then, with the notation as
above, P is insecure if and only if there is a set T ⊆ {E1, E2, Es, Ds} ⊂ Γ1(s)
such that one of the following condition holds.
1. The set {α1(x, y)} ∪ T generates a subgroup of DY multiplicatively.
2. The set T ∪Γ2(x, y)∪Γ3(x, y);x, y ∈ {1, 2, s} generates a nontrivial subgroup
of DY.
where Γj(x, y) denotes the set Γ2 with specific users x and y.
Proof. Let us first note that the first condition takes care of a rather trivial
situation. It can only come about if the user x initiates the conversation by
sending the message without an encryption or if she applies her own decryption
operator! In any case, it is clear that the protocol is insecure. Next, suppose the
second condition holds. Then the set T ∪ Γ2(x, y) ∪ Γ3(x, y) a subgroup S. In
particular, E−11 , E
−1
2 ∈ S. Hence, there is a string λ ∈ S such that λNi = ǫ since
the latter is the identity element of the group. It follows from the definition 1
that the protocol is insecure. This proves the sufficiency of the condition.
To prove necessity of the condition assume that the protocol is insecure. Then
there is some string λ such that λNi = ǫ, i ≥ 1 First, suppose that i = 1 and
N1 = α1 does not contain E1 or E2. Then we must have α1 = ǫ or D
k
x, for some
integer k. In the first case, we obtain the trivial subgroup by choosing T to be
empty set and in the second case we choose T = {E1}. In either case, the first
condition of the theorem is satisfied.
Now let Ni, i ≥ 1 satisfy the above equation. Suppose i = 2j is even (the
proof for the odd case is similar). Then
N2j(1, 2) = (βj(1, 2)αj(1, 2) · · ·α2(1, 2)β1(1, 2))α1(1, 2)
≡ φj(1, 2)α1(1, 2) and
λ = α−11 (1, 2)φ
−1
j (1, 2)
By assumption, λ ∈ (Γ1(s)∪Γ2(x, y)∪Γ3(x, y))
∗ ≡ H . Let H ′ = H ∪{α1(1, 2)}.
Clearly we may restrict to the set {1, 2, s} of users. Observe first that any
Ni(x, y) is of the form E
i1
x E
j1
y E
i2
x E
j2
y · · ·EximEjm where ir and jr are inte-
gers. Recall that we identify E−1x = Dx. Suppose that all the exponents of
E1, and E2 in the expansion of N2j(1, 2) are non-negative. We may assume
that at least one of them, say that of E1, is positive (otherwise there is noth-
ing to prove). Then by successive application of E1 or E2 we conclude that
E−11 is in H . From the definition of the sets Γ2 and Γ3 we can interchange the
role of E1 and E2 and we conclude that E
−1
2 is also a member of H . Choose
T = {Es, E1, E2, Ds}. Then, T ∪Γ21, 2∪Γ31, 2 generates a subgroup. Hence, we
may assume that N2j(1, 2) contains negative powers of Ei, i = 1, 2. In any case
we have N2j(1, 2) = φj(1, 2)α1(1, 2) and λ = α
−1
1 (1, 2)φ
−1
j (1, 2). As φj(1, 2) ∈ H
we conclude that α−11 ∈ H . Let α
−1
1 = E
−i1
1 E
−j1
2 E
−i2
1 E
−j2
2 · · ·E
−im
1 E
−jm
2 ∈ H
Where ik, jk are integers. We recall that α1 may contain only E1, E2, or D1.
Thus, no jk can be negative. We have assumed that not all of them are zero
for otherwise we are back to the first condition. Therefore, we may write α−11 =
Ei11 D
j1
2 E
i2
1 D2j2 · · ·E
im
1 D
jm
2 We assume that none of the exponents in the middle
(that is, j1, i2, · · · , im) are zero and consider several cases. As α
−1
1 belongs to
the set H , it must be of the form
α−11 (1, 2) = α
(a1
1
,...,ak
1
)(1, 2)β(b
1
1
,...,bs
1
)(1, 2)Ec11 E
d1
2
α(a
1
2
,...,ak
2
)(1, 2)β(b
1
2
,...,bs
2
)(1, 2)Ec21 E
d2
2 · · ·
where α(a
1
1
,...,ak
1
)(1, 2) ≡ α
a1
1
2 (1, 2) · α
ak
1
k+1(1, 2) and β
(b1
1
,...,bs
1
)(1, 2) ≡
β
b1
1
1 (1, 2) · · ·β
bs
1
l (1, 2) etc.. Now, the set H contains αi(x, y), i ≥ 2 and βj(x, y)
for all x 6= y and all Ei. Hence we may replace αi(1, 2) with α(s, 2), βj(1, 2)
with βj(s, 2) and E1 with Es. This substitution will replace all E1 and D1 by
Es and Ds respectively. Now we may apply Es, Ds and E2 in appropriate order
to obtain D2 in H . We next consider α
−1
1 (2, 1) and arguing as above we conclude
that D1 ∈ H and that the semigroup generated by H is a subgroup.
We note that in case of insecure protocols the subgroup generated by H is
the full group generated by the encryption operators {E1, E2, Es} of the three
parties concerned : the initiator, the intended receiver and the adversary. The
theorem gives an abstract algebraic characterization of security. For practical
purposes we would want a syntactic characterization in terms of the strings of
operators. For this we start with a definition.
Definition 2 Let S = Ei1j1E
i2
j2
· · ·Eikjk be a string with i1, . . . , ik integers and
j1, . . . , jk ∈ {1, . . . , n} in reduced form. For an integer r in the set {1, . . . , n}
define the r-index of S to be the sequence of integers (r(1), r(2), . . . , r(m)) which
appear as nonzero exponents of Er in S. We say that the r-index of S is negative
if the largest integer in the sequence is negative.
If the r index of a string S is negative then all the exponents of Er (there
must be at least one) are negative. That is, only Dr appears in S. Such strings
are unbalanced as per [DY82]. Let us also say that r− index is zero if no powers
of Er appears in the string. Now we can state the second characterization of
insecure protocols.
Theorem 2 Let P a two-party cascade protocol. Assume that the legitimate
parties have names 1 and 2 and the former initiates the conversation. Then P
is insecure if and only if one of the following holds:
1. The 2-index of α1(1, 2) is zero and the 1-index of α1(1, 2) is zero or negative.
2. There exists some αi, i ≥ 2 whose 1-index is negative.
3. There exists some βi, i ≥ 1 whose 2-index is negative.
Proof. Sufficiency. If the first condition above is satisfied then it is easy to see
that the first condition in Theorem 1 holds. Suppose now that the second or the
third condition holds. We can use arguments similar to those in the previous
theorem to show that E1 and E2 are in S the semigroup generated by H =
Γ1(s) ∪ Γ2(x, y) ∪ Γ3(x, y), x, y ∈ {1, 2, s}.
Necessity. The proof of necessity is rather long. We only outline the steps. Sup-
pose P is insecure. From Theorem 1 we infer that either the first condition holds
or S is a subgroup. If the first condition holds then clearly the 2-index of α1(1, 2)
is zero and the 1-index of α1(1, 2) must be zero or negative. We may thus assume
that S is a subgroup. Then E−11 ∈ S. Write E
−1
1 is a product of αi(x, y), i ≥ 2,
βi(x, y), i ≥ 1 and the Ei’s. We use induction on the length l of such product.
The case l = 1 is clear. Let l = k. That is, E−11 = γΦ where γ ∈ H and Φ is in S.
By assumption, none of the factors in Φ have negative r-index for r ∈ {1, 2, s}.
Now αk(i, j) (resp. βk(i, j)) cannot have negative j (resp. i) index. Next show
that if γ1, γ2 ∈ H have nonnegative r-index (r = 1, 2) then their product γ1γ2
also has nonnegative r-index. This is straightforward but lengthy. By assump-
tion each of the generators of S have nonnegative r− index r ∈ {1, 2}. Hence,
as γ and Φ have positive r-index for r = 1, 2 and so does γΦ, a contradiction.
The theorem yields the following corollary in some concrete realization of the
cryptosystem. We recall that there may extra relations among the generators in
any such realization. Let these relations be given by the set R ⊂ F (E) where
we put any x ∈ R equal to ǫ. Two strings in F (E) are equivalent if they can be
reduced to each other by insertion or deletion of elements from R. Then we have
Corollary 1 A concrete realization of a two-party protocol is insecure if and
only if each string in the equivalence classes of αi, i > 1 and βj , j ≥ 1 has
nonnegative 1 and 2 index.
3.2 Algebraic characterization of security of general protocols
In this section we will consider protocols with nonces (e.g. name-stamp). In
the cascade protocols the structure of the plain text message itself played no
role in the protocol. A name-stamp protocol uses the structure of the mes-
sage to improve security. We use the notation as above. Now each user has
more operations available. We have first the operation of nonce Ax for user x:
Ax(M) = Mx. We also have the partial inverse δx, the deletion operator, that
is, δxAx(M) = M . The problem is that it only makes sense to apply δx imme-
diately after Ax (after reduction in Eis and Dis). In fact, in [DY82] and other
treatments [DEK82,EG83] the application of δx is undefined in all other cases.
However, for the algebraic structures we require that all products be well-defined.
Let Ox = {Ey, Dx, Ay, δy|y any user } be the set of operators available to user
x. Let A be the set of operators Ax and ∆, the set of δxs. We postulate the
following relations:.ExDx = DxEx = ǫ and δxAx = ǫ. Note that in this case we
no longer have group since Axδx 6= ǫ.
Definition 3 A two-party name-stamp protocol is given by the following se-
quences of strings: αi(x, y) ∈ ({Ex, Ey, Dx}∪A∪∆)
∗, βi(x, y) ∈ ({Ex, Ey, Dy}∪
A ∪∆)∗
We will assume that the protocol is well-defined, that is, there are no illegal oper-
ations of δx. Let O = ∪xOx be the set of operators of all users. Let GO be the free
monoid generated by O. We are identifying E−1x with Dx. We define N0(x, y) =
ǫ,N1(x, y) = α1(x, y), N2(x, y) = β1(x, y)α1(x, y), . . . , N2j−1(x, y) = αj(x, y)N 2j−2(x, y)
and N2j(x, y) = βj(x, y)N2j−1(x, y) as before. We define a protocol to be inse-
cure if there is a string γ ∈ (Γ ′1 ∪ Γ
′
2 ∪ Γ
′
3)
∗ such that γNi(x, y) = ǫ for some
i ≥ 1 where
Γ ′1(s) = {Ex, Es, Ds, Ax, δx| x ∈ {a, b, s}}
Γ ′2 = {αi(x, y)|x, y ∈ {a, b, s} and i ≥ 2}
Γ ′2 = {βi(x, y)|x, y ∈ {a, b, s} and i ≥ 1}
The motivation for the above definition of insecurity is similar to the case of
cascade protocols. Excluding the trivial case (when the initiator a sends the first
string without encryption!) we state the algebraic characterization of security of
these general protocols.
Theorem 3 A name-stamp protocol is insecure if and only if (Γ ′1 ∪ Γ
′
2 ∪ Γ
′
3)
∗
contains the subgroup of G0 freely generated by {Ea, Eb, Es}.
Proof. (Sketch) We observe first that, as in Theorem 1 the condition for inse-
curity is equivalent to requiring that the string α1(a, b) has an inverse. Clearly,
the condition is sufficient since we can generate Da = E
−1
a and Db = E
−1
b and
hence the inverse of any string.
The necessity of the condition can proved using arguments similar to Theo-
rem 1. We write α1(a, b)
−1 as a product of elements from Γ ′1 ∪ Γ
′
2 ∪Γ
′
3. Then by
appropriate changes a→ s or b→ s we can obtain Da and Db.
The theorem implies, in particular, that the empty string ǫ is in (Γ ′1 ∪Γ
′
2∪Γ
′
3)
+,
where for any set of strings S, S+ = S∗−{ǫ}. The security of two-party ping-pong
protocol is therefore equivalent to a decision problem for a regular language: is
the empty string a member of the language. For our case the problem is tractable.
It is fairly straightforward to write an algorithm for the decision problem for the
language (Γ ′1 ∪ Γ
′
2 ∪ Γ
′
3)
+ whose time complexity is bounded by polynomial in
the length of the protocol. An efficient algorithm is given in [DEK82].
Let us consider some special protocols.
Proposition 1 Let a protocol P be given by the following strings. α1, β1 =
γ1α
−1
1 , α2 = µ2γ
−1
1 , β2 = γ2µ
−1
2 · · · such that α1, γi and µi have nonnegative
1 and 2 index, are not empty, do not contain any δx and have their left-most
symbol appropriate name-stamp Ax. Here σ
−1 denotes the left inverse of σ. Then
P is secure.
Proof. (Sketch) Suppose P is insecure. Then there exist v1, v2, . . . , vk ∈ (Γ
′
1∪Γ
′
2∪
Γ ′3) such that D1 = v1 · · · vk. Then one of the vi’s must be some αi = µiγ
−1
i−1.
But the right-most symbol of γ−1i−1 is a δx. Hence, it must cancel. In fact, all
the inverses must cancel. We are left with strings γi’s and µj ’s. But these have
nonnegative 1-index and from the previous section one cannot obtain D1 with
these generators.
We can similarly show that if in some protocol P we have some αi(1, 2), i >
1(βj(1, 2), j ≥ 1) such that the substrings on the left and right of the left-most
δ2(δ1) have negative 1-index(2-index) then the protocol is insecure. We only have
to consider αi(1, s) and cancel appropriate symbols using Ds, As, and E1.
3.3 Examples, Extensions, and Concrete Realizations
Consider now a simplified variant of Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol
[Low96]. We have α1(1, 2) = E2A1, β(1, 2) = E1δ2D2 and α2(1, 2) = E2D1. In
detail, user 1 stamps its nonce and sends the string to 2 using the latter’s public
key encryption E2. User 2 then decrypts the message and sends it back to 1
using its public encryption and 1 decrypts the message and sends it to 2 after
encryption. We see at once that the protocol is insecure because α2(1, 2) = E2D1
has negative 1-index. We observe that the reason it is insecure is because there
is no nonce in stage 2. Hence, if we modify the protocol [Low96] with α1(1, 2) =
E2A1, β
′
(1, 2) = E1A2δ1D2 and α
′
2(1, 2) = E2δ2D1 from the above proposition it
follows that the protocol is secure. On the other hand, following protocol [DY82]
is insecure: α1(1, 2) = E2A1E2, β1(1, 2) = E1A2D2δ1D2, since in β1(1, 2) the
substrings to left and right of δ1 have negative 2-index. We therefore observe that
with the use of above propositions we can eliminate large classes of protocols
as insecure. Although we do not have a necessary and sufficient criterion for
security (as in the case of ping-pong protocols) we can write efficient algorithms
to verify security. These are essentially rewriting algorithms in groups [Sim94].
We investigated the algebraic structures arising out of protocols based on
public or asymmetric key cryptosystem. Can we extend this to private or sym-
metric key cryptography. In case of, two party protocols the answer is yes. If
users 1 and 2 share a private key then we set E1 = E2 and remove E1 from
adversary’s set of operations Γ (see the previous section). The security of the
protocols is defined as above.
A (concrete) realization of an abstract protocol is a map φ : GO → G which
is monoid homomorphism. Here GO is the free monoid on the set O of op-
erations available to all users and G is some monoid. Any map from O to
G can be uniquely extended to a homomorphism φ : GO → G. In general,
G will satisfy some extra relations. For example, if G is finite then for any
x ∈ G, x|G| = e Then, the security criteria of Theorem 3 is inadequate since
any subset of G will generate nontrivial subgroups. An example is the cyclic
subgroup {E1, E
2
1 , . . . , E
|G|
1 = e}. Hence, we must modify the security condition.
Our proposal is to require the relevant groups be only pseudo-free [Riv04,Mic05]
instead of free. Informally, a group G is pseudo-free if any polynomial time prob-
abilistic algorithm designed to find relations in G that are not satisfied in a free
group will succeed with only negligible probability. Let P be a two-party proto-
col and let Γ be the set of operators (in reduced form) available to an adversary
as in the preceding sections. Then φ(Γ ) may contain non-trivial groups. Suppose
all these groups are pseudo-free. Then any special relations that the adversary
may try to exploit can only be found with negligible probability by any feasi-
ble algorithm. We note that the security of a protocol may be compromised in
two ways. First, the adversary may break the cryptosystem itself, for example,
by finding an efficient algorithm to factorize integers in RSA-based cryptosys-
tem. The second way is to exploit some weakness in the protocol itself as in the
Needham-Schroeder protocol. Both cases are covered by the following definition.
Definition 4 A protocol P is insecure if and only if one of the following holds.
1. In the free group Γ , the set of operations available to the adversary generate
a nontrivial subgroup.
2. The maximal subgroup contained in the monoid generated by Γ ′1
⋃
Γ ′2
⋃
Γ ′3 in
a family of concrete realizations of the encryption and decryption operators
is not pseudo-free.
If the basic public key cryptosystem is RSA then in general the encryption
operators Ei are based on different moduli and the messages may have to be split
into blocks of appropriate size before each encryption. The operators Ei are quite
complicated and form a non-abelian group. In the ElGamal encryption scheme
[ElG85] the encryption operator is a map Ea : Z
∗
p → Z
∗
p where Ea(m) = mg
xak
. All operations are modulo p, g is a primitive generator of Z∗p , g andg
xa are
publicly known. The number k is randomly chosen by b and gk is publicly known.
The adversary does not know k or xa and hence Ea. This is similar to the case of
private key cryptosystem since we have to remove Ea from the set of operations
available to adversary. If all users use the same p the group is abelian. However,
if they choose different primes the messages have to be block and the resulting
realization of the DY group is non-abelian in general.
4 Discussion
In this work we presented an algebraic characterization of security of public key
protocols. We may question the advantages of the algebraic characterization.
First, there are theoretical advantages. We have at our disposal powerful tech-
niques of group theory. To prove some fact in the setting of free groups we can
define a homomorphism from the free group to another (not necessarily free)
group which has a simpler structure. For example, in Theorem 2 we defined the
notion of r-index and stated that it is positive for the product of two strings
whose r-index is positive. The proof is given by induction and a tedious case by
case consideration on the structure of the two strings. It is possible to give a
group theoretic proof by defining a homomorphism to another group via some
defining relations. Secondly, there are practical advantages too. Sometimes, of-
ten computations and rewriting in groups is simpler and we have at our disposal
several computational tools [Sim94].
This work is an attempt to give a new, algebraic perspective on security and
there is still a lot of ground to be covered. Can we extend the formal algebraic
characterization to other protocols? An essential requirement for group structure
is that all the operations be invertible. For example, could also include operations
like pairing. We then just have the structure of a monoid, as in the case of name-
stamp protocols and we have seen that these can be dealt with in an algebraic
setting. We aim to deal with these issues in the future.
References
AR02. M. Abadi and P. Rogaway. Reconciling two views of cryptography. J. of
Cryptology, 15(2):103–127, 2002.
BAN89. M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham. A logic of authentication. In Proc.
Royal. Soc. Lond. A., pages 426:233–271, 1989.
DEK82. D. Dolev, S. Even, and R. M. Karp. On the security of ping-pong protocols.
Inform. and Control, 55:57–68, 1982.
DY82. D. Dolev and A. C. Yao. On the security of public key protocols. IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, IT-30(2):198–206, 1982.
EG83. S. Even and O. Goldreich. On the security of multiparty ping-pong protocols.
Research Report TR-04-02, Comp Sc. Dept., Tecnicion, Haifa, 1983.
ElG85. T. ElGamal. A public key encryption and signature scheme based on discreet
logarithm. In Proc. of Crypto 84, LNCS 196, pages 10–18. Springer, 1985.
Gol01. O. Goldreich. Foundations of cryptography: basic tools. Cambridge University
Press, 2001.
Low96. G. Lowe. Breaking and fixing the needham-schroeder public-key protocol
using fdr. In Lect. Notes. Comp. Sc., 1055, pages 147–166. Springer, 1996.
Mic05. D. Micciancio. The rsa group is pseudo-free. In Proc. of Eurocrypt 2005,
LNCS 3494, pages 387–403. Springer, 2005.
MKS76. W. Magnus, A. Karras, and D. Solitar. Combinatorial group theory. Dover,
1976.
MW04a. D. Micciancio and B. Warinschi. Completeness theorems for abadi-rogaway
logic of encrypted expressions. J. of Comp. Security, 15:99–121, 2004.
MW04b. D. Micciancio and B. Warinschi. Soundness of formal encryption in the
presence of active adversaries. In Proc. of TCC (Theory of Cryptography
Conferebce) 2004, LNCS 2951, pages 133–151. Springer, 2004.
NS78. R. M. Needham and M. D. Schroeder. Using encryption for authentication
in large network computers. Comm. of the ACM, 21(2):993–999, 1978.
Riv04. R. L. Rivest. The notion of pseudo-free groups. In Proc. of TCC 2004, LNCS
2951, pages 505–521. Springer, 2004.
Rot95. Joseph J. Rotman. An introduction to the theory of groups. Springer-Verlag,
1995.
Sim94. C. C. Sims. Computations with finitely presented groups. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1994.
